We document and analyze a new puzzle in international political economy. For a broad sample of countries, we show that in the very large majority of cases it is lower-earning industries that receive relatively high levels of trade protection. This pattern of protection holds even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to be the relatively abundant factor of production and therefore would be expected in many standard political-economy frameworks to receive relatively low, not high, levels of protection. We propose and model one possible explanation: that individual attitudes about inequality-both envy and altruismlead to systematic di¤erences in support for trade protection across industries with sectors employing lower-earning workers more intensively being relatively preferred recipients for trade protection. We conduct original survey experiments in China and the United States and provide strong evidence that individual policy opinions about sector-speci…c trade protection depend on the earnings of workers in the sector. We also present structural estimates of the in ‡uence of envy and altruism on sector-speci…c trade policy preferences. Our estimates indicate that both envy and altruism in ‡uence support for trade protection in the United States and that altruism in ‡uences policy opinions in China.
Introduction
This paper documents a new puzzle in international political economy. For a broad sample of countries, we show that in the very large majority of cases it is lower-earning industries that receive relatively high levels of trade protection. Because this pattern of protection holds even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to be the relatively abundant factor of production, it is arguably at odds with the common empirical …nding that declining, comparative disadvantage industries are more likely to receive protection.
Moreover, it is at odds with most theoretical political economy models which tend to either predict, consistent with most empirical work, that losing sectors from international trade receive more protection or that expanding sectors that gain from greater trade should enjoy more government support. Existing accounts are generally good at explaining support for winners or for losers but not why winning sectors are supported in some countries and losing sectors in others and do not explain why lower-earning sectors seem to be advantaged in the contest for government support in almost all countries. Our paper analyzes this puzzle in two steps.
First, we propose and model one possible explanation: that individual preferences over trade policy are shaped by considerations of others, above and beyond one's own income. A growing literature has explored theoretically and empirically the possibility that individuals may have "other-regarding" preferences. 1 One important approach assumes that individual utility functions depend not only on the individual's own material payo¤ but also on the material payo¤s that others receive. These interdependent, social preferences could include everything from altruism, for which utility increases with the well being of other people, to spitefulness, for which utility decreases in the well being of others.
Our model of trade policy incorporates the form of social preferences known as "inequity aversion," in which individuals are altruistic toward others if their material payo¤s are below an equitable benchmark but envious of others whose payo¤s are above this level (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) . We show how individual attitudes about inequality-both envy and 1 For reviews, see Sobel (2005) , Fehr and Schmidt (2006) , Levitt and List (2007) , and DellaVigna (2009). altruism-lead to systematic di¤erences in support for trade protection across industries with sectors employing lower-earning workers more intensively being relatively preferred recipients for trade protection. The essence of our argument is that if individual citizens and policymakers care not only about how trade policy in ‡uences their real incomes but also how it a¤ects their incomes relative to others, with a preference for policies that promote income equality, government policies will tend to support industries that employ lower-earning, less-skilled workers more intensively. Importantly, we suggest the possibility that these preferences will be observed across lots of di¤erent types of countries and will in ‡uence the observed sectoral distribution of trade protection across countries with very di¤erent factor endowments and political institutions.
The second step of our paper is to evaluate the argument empirically through the analysis of original survey experiments on national samples of citizens in China and the United States.
These analyses include two main tests. First, in a survey question, we randomly assign the average wage of the worker in the industry under consideration for trade protection and estimate the e¤ect of variation in workers'wages on support for sectoral trade protection. In both China and the United States, we …nd that sectors with lower average incomes receive broader support for trade protection. Second, we derive from our model and estimate an equation of policy preferences and …nd evidence that the social preferences assumed in our model do in ‡uence support for sector-speci…c trade protection.
Our estimates for the United States indicate that support for sector-speci…c trade protection depends on both altruism and envy. Increasing our measure of altruism (the gap by which a respondent's income exceeds the income of the typical worker in the sector being considered for increased trade protection) by two standard deviations (a $48,400 annual difference) raises the probability that respondents support trade protection by 10 percentage points (about a 30% increase). Similarly, increasing the measure of envy (the gap by which a respondent's income lies below the income of the typical worker in the sector being considered for increased trade protection) by two standard deviations (a $48,800 annual di¤erence), lowers the probability that respondents support trade protection by 18 percentage points (about a 58% decrease). Our estimates for China indicate that support for sector-speci…c trade protection depends on altruism but provides little evidence of a substantively important e¤ect for envy. Increasing the measure of altruism by two standard deviations (a 2,680 yuan di¤erence on a monthly basis) raises the probability that respondents support trade protection by almost 9 percentage points (about a 19% increase). We also present evidence from a follow-up experiment in the United States that social preferences remain important for understanding variation in support for sectoral trade protection when the ine¢ ciency of the policy is made more salient.
Overall, our analysis …nds substantial evidence that Chinese and American citizens exhibit inequity aversion in their preferences for sector-speci…c trade protection. In turn, this feature of preferences has the potential to explain the puzzle of lower-earning sectors receiving greater trade protection in so many countries around the world. Such preferences would be in ‡uential across a wide variety of political economy models of trade including standard lobbying models such as Grossman and Helpman's (1994) protection-for-sale model. Our paper contributes to the political economy trade literature by identifying a new empirical puzzle about the distribution of trade protection across sectors and countries, a puzzle which is not well explained by existing models, and by proposing one possible theoretical solution to that puzzle. Moreover, the paper builds on recent contributions by Rotemberg (2003) and Freund and Ozden (2008) which also adopt nonstandard assumptions about individual preferences to explain patterns of trade policy. The approach in those papers is to suggest if voters had certain types of preferences, certain anomalies in observed trade policymaking could be resolved. Our paper takes a similar approach but also provides evidence that such preferences are actually observed in the area of trade policymaking. This feature of the paper also contributes to the literature on the determinants of trade policy opinions for which various departures from self-interest have been considered. 2 Beyond trade policy, our paper provides a new methodology for investigating the role of envy and altruism in determining policy preferences and this general strategy could be applied to many other areas of economic policymaking for which envy and altruism may be in ‡uential in opinion formation. Finally, our paper contributes to the broader behavioral economics literature on social preferences. Much of the empirical evidence in this literature that individuals have other-regarding preferences is based on how subjects behave in a laboratory setting playing abstract games. 3 Our analysis of policy opinions using survey experiments provides evidence of such preferences in a real political economy setting. Although responses to survey questions are costless, it is precisely these responses and the factors that drive them that policymakers respond to in the policymaking process. As such, evidence of social preferences in policy opinions as presented in this paper suggests one way that the other-regarding behavior observed in so many laboratory environments may in ‡uence actual political-economic outcomes.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present evidence of our puzzle that lower-earning, less-skilled sectors receive more trade protection in many countries around the world. In Section 3, we model trade policy preferences in a setting in which individual preferences display inequity aversion. Our empirical analysis of the role of inequality aversion in sector-speci…c trade preferences in the United States and China is in Section 4, and Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
The Puzzle: Sectoral Wages and the Distribution of Trade Protection
This section documents a new puzzle in the literature on the international distribution of trade protection. For a broad sample of countries, we show that in the very large majority of cases it is low-earning, less-skilled intensive industries that receive relatively high levels of trade protection. This pattern of protection holds even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to be the relatively abundant factor of production and therefore 3 See Levitt and List (2007) for a skeptical review of the real world importance of social preferences observed in laboratory settings but also DellaVigna (2009) for reasons why laboratory results may both over and underestimate the empirical importance of other-regarding preferences.
would be expected in many standard explanations of the determinants of trade policy to receive relatively low, not high, levels of protection. against normalized average wages in those sectors. 4 This graph shows a familiar pattern to students of trade policymaking in the United States. Tari¤s are relatively low in the United
States but those industries that use low-skilled, lower paid workers more intensively receive higher levels of trade protection. This graph would look very similar employing alternative measures of trade protection and skill intensity.
The most common explanation for the pattern of trade protection observed in this and other similar graphs is that it re ‡ects the more general phenomenon that comparative disadvantage sectors-losers from expanding trade-get more protection. A large empirical literature has documented the tendency of governments to provide greater trade protection to declining industries. In the United States and Europe for example, heavily protected industries include textiles, footwear, clothing, and agriculture which have been contracting for decades. Gawande and Krishna (2003) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) review a number of alternative measures that have been documented to be correlated with higher levels of trade protection in declining industries. These include industry growth rates in terms of output and employment and changes in import penetration ratios. The general idea is simply that governments tend to pick losers when they intervene to support domestic industries.
The reasons for this pattern of intervention are not obvious. As Baldwin and RobertNicoud (2007) note, the dominant approach for explaining which industries get protected is various lobbying models and there are good reasons to think that larger, expanding industries would have more resources for lobbying governments to support their businesses. 5 Some explanations for this phenomenon include the idea that losing sectors lobby harder because rents from lobbying are not competed away through entry of new …rms, at least as long as 4 The data are for 4-digit, ISIC, revision 3 manufacuturing sectors. The source for the tari¤ data is the TRAINS database. The source for the wage data is the most recent UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT4 2008 ISIC Rev. 3). 5 See, for example, Olson (1965) , Stilger (1971), Peltzman (1976) , Hillman (1982) , Milner (1987) , Grossman and Helpman (1994) , Gilligan (1997) , Hiscox (1999) , and Goldberg and Maggi (1999). the bene…ts of protection are not too great (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007 ). Grossman and Helpman (1996) focus on the possibility that the asymmetry in lobbying e¤ort may be due to greater free riding in expanding sectors. Krueger (1990) argues that policymakers privilege declining industries because this supports the income of known workers whereas supporting expanding sectors supports unknown bene…ciaries. A number of papers have suggested various ways in which policymakers and/or citizens may be generally averse to income losses and that this directly a¤ects how governments set policy in declining and expanding industries (Freund and Ozden 2008, Corden 1974 ). 6 One implication of the idea that governments tend to pick losing sectors is that we should 6 See Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) for a more complete review. expect signi…cant di¤erences across countries in the distribution of trade protection across di¤erent sectors of the economy. While some losing sectors may be common across all countries because the source of their decline is due to changes in technology or consumer tastes in all countries, many changes in the fortunes of industries will re ‡ect di¤erences in comparative advantage across countries. For example, it is not an accident that commonly cited declining industries in the United States include textiles, footwear, and toys. These industries are declining in the U.S. in part because they use less-skilled labor intensively and the U.S. is not relatively well endowed with less-skilled workers. In contrast, these industries have been expanding in other countries which are well endowed with less-skilled workers. More generally, to the extent that winning and losing sectors are in part determined by comparative advantage, we would expect that patterns of trade protection vary across countries according to their relative factor endowments.
To investigate this question further, Figure 2 plots trade-weighted tari¤s in Chinese manufacturing industries in 2000 against normalized average wages in those sectors. 7 While the level of tari¤s in China is higher than the United States, what is striking about this graph is how similar the distribution of protection by factor intensity is compared to the United States. Those sectors which employ less-skilled, lower paying workers more intensively have higher levels of trade protection. This is evident both in the handful of very high tari¤ sectors but also when considering only those sectors with applied tari¤ rates below 40%. Under the common empirical claim that China is relatively well-endowed with less-skilled workers, the pattern of protection described in this graph is not easily explained by describing these sectors as losing sectors as in the U.S. case. It is, of course, possible to describe some individual sectors that use less-skilled workers more intensively as in decline in China for a number of possible reasons. For example, sectors for which state owned enterprises are large employers may be experiencing employment declines as the sector becomes more competitive. More 7 The data are for 4-digit, ISIC, revision 3 manufacuturing sectors. The source for the tari¤ data is again the TRAINS database. The Chinese wage data was obtained from the China Data Centre at the University of Michigan. The original dataset consists of over 500 4-digit industries under the Chinese Industrial Classi…cation System (GB/T 4754 -1994). We then converted the data into 4-digit ISIC rev. generally, as China develops, wages are increasing, which may erode its comparative advantage in some sectors. That said, this graph at least suggests the possibility that lower-paying and less-skill intensive sectors are more likely to get greater trade protection in a setting in which we would expect these sectors to generally be comparative advantage industries.
To investigate this possibility more systematically, we examine the correlation of trade protection and skill intensity in a large cross-section of countries. Our data for this analysis are from the Trade, Production and Protection Figure 3 plots the Spearman rank correlation between weighted tari¤s and average wages in 3-digit ISIC, revision 2 manufacturing industries in each country against GDP per capita. 10 The …gure reveals two signi…cant patterns in the data. First, for all but two of the countries, the Spearman's rank correlation coe¢ cient is negative indicating that industries with lower wages receive greater protection in most countries. Second, the magnitude of this correlation does not vary across countries by GDP per capita. If we treat GDP per capita as a rough measure of human/physical capital endowments, this suggests that there is little evidence in this data that comparative advantage is driving the distribution of trade protection across sectors. We do not think that this data is necessarily at odds with the general claim in the literature that losing industries are more likely to be protected but we think it suggests a new puzzle-why do industries that employ lower paid, less-skilled workers more intensively get greater trade protection across all types of countries-for the literature on the determinants of trade protection. 11 For a broad sample of countries, we have presented descriptive evidence suggesting that in the very large majority of cases it is lower earning industries that receive relatively high levels 9 The graphs reported also exclude tobacco products for all countries because this sector is almost always a signi…cant outlier in each country. The results are qualitatively similar if tobacco products is included though it does somewhat attenuate the negative correlations.
1 0 GDP data is from the most recent Penn World Table, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. 1 1 We also examined some alternative ways to investigate the possibility that low-earning, low-skilled sectors generally receive greater levels of trade protection. For example, we calculated the di¤erence between the median trade-weighted tari¤ in industries with average wages above the median pay industry and the median trade-weighted tari¤ in industries below the median pay industry and show that this statistic is never positive and mostly negative in our sample countries and that these di¤erences are if anything larger in countries with relatively lower GDP per capita. These patterns are consistent with those reported in Figure 3 . of trade protection. This pattern of industrial trade protection is puzzling because it holds even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to be the relatively abundant factor of production and therefore would be expected in many standard explanations of the determinants of trade policy to receive relatively low, not high, levels of protection. 12 
A Social Concerns Model of Trade Protection
The data reviewed in the previous section indicates the possibility that sectors that employ lower-paid, less-skilled workers more intensively may receive greater trade protection across countries with very di¤erent factor endowments. There are a number of alternative explanations for this pattern of protection. For example, it may be that tari¤ levels are constrained by GATT and WTO commitments and these policies are dominated by the domestic political interests of relatively wealthy countries for which losing sectors certainly do include industries that employ less-skilled workers more intensively. Another alternative might be that lower paid sectors lobby harder because their opportunity costs for lobbying are lower. Another possibility which we wish to explore in some detail is that individual citizens and policymakers care not only about how trade policy in ‡uences their real incomes but also how it a¤ects their incomes relative to others, with a preference for policies that promote income equality.
As a result, policies that support the incomes of low earners are favored in the policymaking process.
A growing literature has explored theoretically and empirically the possibility that some individuals may have other regarding preferences. Sobel (2005) , Fehr and Schmidt (2006) , and DellaVigna (2009) provide reviews of the empirical evidence of these preferences and various theoretical frameworks for understanding this evidence. One signi…cant approach in this literature is models of social preferences which assume that individual utility functions depend not only on the individual's own material payo¤ but also on the material payo¤s that others receive. The main idea in these treatments is that individuals maximize their utility as they would in more conventional self-interested models but they do not solely care about their own material outcomes. These social preferences could include everything from altruism for which utility increases with the well being of other people to spitefulness for which utility decreases in the well being of others.
One in ‡uential form of social preference is inequity aversion. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for example, posit that individuals are altruistic toward others if their material payo¤s are below an equitable benchmark but envious of others whose payo¤s are above this level.
They propose a simple utility function to capture this idea and argue that it is consistent with behavior commonly observed in a wide variety of experimental social interactions such as dictator games, ultimatum games, trust games, public good games, punishment games, and gift exchange games. 13 Empirically the claim is not that all individuals are averse to inequality but that there are at least a signi…cant proportion of individuals who are and that this preference has an important e¤ect on social interactions
In this section, we apply the idea of inequality aversion to the problem of trade policymaking. Our argument is that if individual citizens and policymakers care not only about how trade policy in ‡uences their real incomes but also how it a¤ects their incomes relative to others, with a preference for policies that promote income equality, government policies will tend to support industries that employ lower earning, less skilled workers more intensively.
Importantly, we suggest the possibility that these preferences will be observed across lots of di¤erent types of countries and will in ‡uence the observed sectoral distribution of trade protection across countries with very di¤erent factor endowments and political institutions.
Our argument is related to an older literature that suggested the possibility that governments use trade policy to combat inequality. For example, "social change" arguments discussed in Gawande and Krishna (2003) , Baldwin (1985) , Ball (1967) , Constantopoulos (1974) and Corden (1974) Our theoretical model closely follows standard political economy trade models with the key di¤erence being that individuals in our model care about their own incomes and their incomes relative to others-they are motivated by both envy and altruism. 14 The model focuses on identifying how envy and altruism in ‡uence policy preferences about trade protection in a standard setting and then we discuss more formally how such preferences may in ‡uence policymaking outcomes in diverse institutional settings.
In a perfectly competitive economy with a population size of N and n sectors, individuals maximize the utility function given by
This utility function has two components: utility from consumption (
Goods/sectors and types of individuals-as all individuals within a sector are identical-are indexed by i, i = 1; 2; :::n. x 0 is the consumption of the numeraire good 0 and x i is the consumption of non-numeraire good i. The utility functions u i ( ) are increasing functions which are di¤erentiable, separable, and strictly concave.
To account for inequality aversion, we incorporate a social preference term into the individual's utility function. The term for inequality aversion is same as the speci…cation in Equation (1) in Fehr and Schmidt (1999: 822) . In particular, Fehr and Schmidt specify one 1 4 Speci…cally, we adopt the same assumptions and notation for the economic environment as in Grossman and Helpman (1994) except for the speci…cation of individual utility functions. parameter ( ) for "altruism" when I i > I i ; and the other parameter for "envy" ( ) when I i < I i . This speci…cation of the utility function implies that an individual would feel altruistic to those who earn less than him/her, and feel envious to those who earn more at the same time.
Let i indicate the fraction of population N working in sector i, and we assume that workers in sector i all earn identical incomes which are a function of their labor and the return to sector-speci…c skills and/or inputs owned only by individuals working in each respective sector. Note that an individual owns at most one type of sector-speci…c input, and we assume the sector-speci…c factor input is indivisible and non-tradable. The technologies to produce these goods have constant returns to scale, and the speci…c factor inputs have inelastic supplies. The numeraire good 0 is produced with labor alone and sets the economywide return to labor. The non-numeraire good i is produced with labor and the sector-speci…c factor input. We normalize the wage of good 0 to 1, and the aggregate reward to the speci…c factor depends on the domestic price of the good, that is, i (p i ); where p i is the domestic price. We index each sector's per capita return such that
The total income (I i ) to an individual in sector i, is equal to their wage of 1 plus
We also denote the exogenous world price of goods to be p i .
The net revenue per capita from trade policies (tari¤s or subsidies) is expressed as
where 
Given these assumptions, we can derive individuals' indirect utility in sector i as follows:
Individual preferences about trade policy in sector j are determined by how a marginal change in the price of good j due to a tari¤ or subsidy will impact this function:
where
Hence, an increase of price for good j will tend to reduce the welfare of individual i because of the net negative e¤ect of the impact on consumer welfare and tari¤ revenue is
inequality aversion means that an increase in the price for good j reduces the individual i's welfare due to envy if individuals in sector j earn more than individuals in sector i but increases welfare due to altruism if individuals in sector j earn less than individuals in sector i. These two relationships imply that an individual considering whether or not to support sector-speci…c trade protection that would increase the price and incomes in another sector will, all else equal, be less likely to support barriers if they have a lower income than workers in the industry under consideration for protection-envy e¤ect-and more likely to support barriers if they have a higher income than workers in the industry under consideration for protection-altruism e¤ect. Our empirical work will test this central feature of our model.
For i = j, individuals in this group will gain income from tari¤ protection. However, the e¤ect of inequality aversion may either increase or decrease workers' welfare, depending on where sector i's per capita factor endowment return falls in the overall income distribution as well as on the degree of altruism and envy.
This model identi…es how envy and altruism in ‡uence policy preferences about trade protection in a standard setting and provides clear empirical predictions that we will evaluate in the next section of the paper. It is straightforward to see that the preferences described in our model would tend to push policy outcomes in a direction for which lower-earning industries tend to receive higher levels of protection under a number of alternative assumptions about the policymaking process-that is inequality aversion constitutes one possile answer to the empirical puzzle illustrated in Another relatively simple way to think about the policy implications of the model of preferences sketched above is to consider the case of a social welfare maximizing planner. In this setting, aggregate envy toward workers in a sector will tend to lower protection in an industry while aggregate altruism towards workers in a sector will tend to raise protection in a sector. Lower-earning sectors will have lower levels of aggregate envy and higher levels of aggregate altruism and thus be more likely to be protected than higher-earning sectors. 15 Many political economy models of trade are in e¤ect models for which a policymaker weighs aggregate welfare against some other gain such as lobbying contributions and so to the extent that aggregate welfare is in ‡uential at all in the policymaking process, inequality aversion is likely to push policy toward greater protection for lower-earning sectors and less for higherearning sectors.
One example of a political economy model for which policymakers are assumed in part to care about aggregate welfare is Grossman and Helpman's protection for sale model. The
Grossman and Helpman model is particularly instructive as it has been applied both theoretically and empirically to countries with diverse political institutions and levels of economic development. For example, policymakers in both democratic and non-democratic settings have incentives to weigh aggregate welfare whether it be to win elections or to satisfy a revolution or coup constraint. As such, inequality aversion can explain why low-earning sectors are more heavily protected across countries with diverse political institutions. Importantly, however, in the Grossman and Helpman model, the extent to which policymakers care about aggregate welfare is only one mechanism by which inequality aversion in ‡uences the distribution of trade policy across sectors and privileges low-earning industries. Aggregate envy and altruism among organized sectors making contributions to the policymaker will also tend to lead to a distribution of higher protection in lower-earning industries even if the policymaker does not value aggregate welfare. This is an important insight because it suggests one reason why even if there are di¤erences across political institutions in the extent to which policy is made in the interests of citizens-or how much aggregate welfare is in ‡uential in policymaking-we would still expect envy and altruism among citizens to move policy toward more protection in lower-earning industries in the economy. While it is certainly the case, that the introduction of inequality aversion might have di¤erent consequences under alternative assumptions about either the economy or the political process, there are a wide variety of economic and political settings under which inequality aversion would tend to push both individual preferences and policy equilibria toward great protection for lower-earning sectors of the economy.
Envy and Altruism in Trade-Policy Preferences
Section 2 presented evidence that sectors that employ lower paid, less-skilled workers more intensively receive more protection across countries with diverse factor endowments and suggested that this pattern of protection was not well accounted for in existing political economy models. Section 3 argued that one possible explanation for this pattern of protection is that individual preferences over trade policy are shaped by attitudes about inequality-both envy and altruism-and demonstrated how both these factors imply relatively greater support for policies that protect industries employing lower-earning workers more intensively.
In this section we use national samples of citizens in China and the United States to provide two critical empirical tests in support of our model. First, we show that preferences aggregated across all respondents in each country vary systematically with the treatment income of industry workers: industries with lower-income workers receive broader support for trade protection. Second, we derive from our model and estimate an equation of policy preferences, and we …nd that individuals have the social preferences of altruism and envy assumed in our model in Section 3. Econometrically identifying these preferences lends considerable support to our explanation of the trade-policy puzzle documented in Section 2.
Experimental Design
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to determine if individual policy preferences about sector-speci…c trade protection exhibit inequality aversion and speci…cally to separately To estimate the e¤ect of envy and altruism on support for sector-speci…c trade protection, we designed a survey experiment that randomly assigned respondents to consider trade protection for industries with di¤erent wage levels and recorded their support for sectorspeci…c trade protection. In China, the experiment was conducted in face-to-face interviews for a national sample of the Chinese adult population living in major cities and county-level cities. 16 In the United States, the experiment was conducted over the internet for a nationally representative sample of the U.S. adult population. 17 18 The English translation of the question that we asked to elicit support for sector-speci…c trade protection in China was:
There is an industry in China in which the average worker makes X Yuan per month. To increase the wages of workers in this industry, some people want the government to limit imports of foreign products in this industry. Others oppose these limits because such limits would raise prices that consumers pay and hurt other industries. Do you favor or oppose limiting the import of foreign products in this industry?
IF FAVOR: Do you strongly favor or only somewhat favor limiting the import of foreign products in this industry?
IF OPPOSE: Do you strongly oppose or only somewhat oppose limiting the import of foreign products in this industry?
The question that we asked to elicit support for sector-speci…c trade protection in the United States was:
There is an industry in the United States in which the average worker makes X 1 6 The experiment was conducted by the Horizon Research Consultancy Group. 1 The value of X was assigned randomly across respondents to be equal to 1,000, 2,000, or 4,000 yuan.in China and 18,000, 40,000, or 80,000 dollars in the United States. These values were chosen so that respondents were considering trade protection for low, average, and high wage industries. For example, in the U.S., the low value of $18,000 corresponds to an income a bit higher than the total money income in 2007 for an adult who worked full-time, year round at the 10th percentile in the income distribution. 19 Alternatively, one can think about this low income amount as the wage earned by a worker who worked full-time, year round at about $9.00 per hour or a bit higher than the minimum wage. The average value was selected It is important to consider the wording of this question in comparison to other questions 1 9 The source for this data is the Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, examined in the literature on the determinants of trade-policy opinions. This question asks respondents whether they favor new trade barriers for a single industry and consequently is more narrowly focused than typical question formats which elicit opinions about general trade policy across an entire economy. Moreover, although not stated explicitly, the wording implies that the industry is not the industry the respondent works in or at least is very unlikely to be so. This modi…cation of standard question wordings was implemented to correspond more closely with the empirical puzzle of this paper which is focused on the distribution of protection across industries and with our theoretical model which assumes both that returns-income-to workers and policy setting is determined by industry. 
Experimental Results
Our …rst set of empirical results report the basic …ndings from the experiment-that is the e¤ect of variation in the assumed average wage of the industry under consideration for trade protection on support for sector-speci…c trade protection.
We constructed two measures of support for new trade barriers based on responses to our question. Trade Opinion 1 is set equal to 1 for respondents who favor new trade barriers and is equal to zero for those opposed. Trade Opinion 2 is set equal to 1 for respondents who oppose new trade barriers strongly, 2 for respondents who oppose new trade barriers somewhat, 3
for respondents who favor new trade barriers somewhat, and 4 for those who favor new trade barriers strongly. Each of the measures is increasing in support for a protectionist policy. Table 1 reports the mean estimates for each treatment category and di¤erence-in-means estimates for each combination of treatments and provides substantial evidence that support for sector-speci…c trade barriers are in ‡uenced by the average wage of workers in the industry. For China, support for limiting the import of foreign products is 7 percentage points higher (a 16% increase) for respondents who considered protection for an industry with a low wage versus respondents who considered protection for an industry with an average wage.
This di¤erence was of a similar magnitude for respondents who considered protection for an industry with a low wage versus respondents who considered protection for an industry with a high wage. The results thus suggest for China a signi…cant di¤erence between respondents receiving the low wage treatment and both the middle and high wage treatments but no di¤erence between the middle and high treatments.
In the United States, the results are even more striking. Support for new trade barriers is 8 percentage points higher (a 26% increase) for respondents who considered protection for an industry with a low wage versus respondents who considered protection for an industry with an average wage. This di¤erence was nearly 19 percentage points (an over 90% increase) for respondents who considered protection for an industry with a low wage versus respondents who considered protection for an industry with a high wage. The di¤erences between the middle and high wage treatments are also substantively and statistically signi…cant. It is clear that support for sectoral trade protection is decreasing in the average wages of the sector under consideration for trade protection. Table 2 reports estimates of the di¤erences across our treatment categories controlling for various demographic characteristics of respondents and …xed e¤ects for geographical location, industry of employment, and interviewer. This framework allows identi…cation of the treatment e¤ects within geographical location, industry, and other respondent characteristics. We estimate the following ordinary least squares regressions:
T radeOpinion1 i;k;j;l = 0 + 1 M W T i;k;j;l + 2 HW T i;k;j;l + X i;k;j;l + k + j + l + i;k;j;l (5) where the dependent variable Trade Opinion 1 is the dichotomous measure described above and is increasing in support for trade protection; 22 MWT, Middle Wage Treatment, is a dichotomous measure equal to one if the respondent received the middle wage treatment for that country and zero otherwise; HWT, High Wage Treatment, is a dichotomous measure equal to one if the respondent received the high wage treatment for that country and zero otherwise; X is a vector of demographic variables measuring education attainment, sex, age, and income; 23 k are …xed e¤ects for geographical location; 24 j are …xed e¤ects for industries; 25 l are …xed e¤ects for interviewers (China only); is the error term; i, k, j, and l index individuals, geographic locations, industries, and interviewers respectively; and 0, 1, 2 , and are parameters to be estimated. The omitted treatment category is Low Wage Treatment and so the parameters 1 and 2 should be interpreted respectively as the e¤ect of being exposed to the middle and high wage treatments compared to the low wage treatment.
The estimates reported in Table 2 closely mirror those discussed for These experimental results provide strong evidence that increasing the average wage of the industry under consideration for trade protection reduces support for new trade barriers in that industry. The random assignment of the treatments in the experiment makes us con…dent that these di¤erences are not attributable to other characteristics of the respondents or other selection e¤ects. The result further provides evidence for one possible set of explanations for why low-earning, less-skilled industries tend to be more heavily protected across countries with di¤erent factor endowments and political institutions: citizens, for whatever reason, prefer to support the incomes of low-wage sectors more than high-wage sectors and this preference is in ‡uential in the policymaking process. More generally, this …nding is consistent with our speci…c explanation why low-earning, less-skilled industries tend to be more heavily protected across lots of di¤erent countries: inequality-averse citizens prefer to support the incomes of low-wage sectors more than high-wage sectors. This interpretation, however, should be made with some caution. First, these estimates do not provide direct evidence of Tables 1 and 2 is that they report evidence generally consistent with our argument though there could be other related factors driving preferences in a similar direction. They do, nonetheless, constitute strong evidence that preferences may be important in accounting for the puzzle of low-earning industries receiving more trade protection across many countries around the world. We now turn to more direct evidence of altruism and envy in policy opinions about sectoral trade protection.
Estimation of Envy and Altruism Parameters
To derive our statistical model for estimating the e¤ect of envy and altruism on support for sector-speci…c trade protection, we start with the individual indirect utility function in our model, Equation (3):
In order to estimate the parameters of this model, we need to introduce an error term and specify its distribution. The error term should be thought to be composed primarily of those factors in ‡uencing opinion about sector-speci…c trade protection not included in our model.
We assume that i is normally distributed and that it enters the function additively. We further simplify our model in three ways. First, we omit the terms r(p) and s(p) which represent per capita tari¤ revenues and per capita consumer surplus. Neither argument varies across individuals and so will be captured by the constant in our estimating equation.
Second, the survey question forces respondents to focus on one industry at a time and so we consider only income di¤erences between the individual and the average worker in this industry. Consistent with the model, this assumes that changes in trade policy in one industry do not a¤ect income in other industries. Third, the term
i N is equal to the portion of individual i's income that varies across individuals/sectors and is denoted as I i (and analogously for individual/sector j). These simpli…cations leave us with:
Let z 
where ( ) is the standard normal CDF and 0 is a constant. The variable Trade Opinion 1 described above is de…ned to follow this estimation framework and is set equal to 1 if the respondent favors new trade barriers and is set equal to 0 if they are opposed. In both our surveys, we also measured annual personal income. In China, the survey instrument places individuals into one of 16 monthly personal income categories. We then de…ned the actual magnitude of each respondent's income as equal to the midpoint of the income range in which they placed themselves. This variable, Personal Income, serves as our measure of I i .
For the United States, our survey assigned respondents to one of 19 annual personal income categories and we constructed the variable Personal Income in the same way as for the China data. The variable Other Income is equal to treatments in our survey questions and takes on the three randomly assigned values of 1,000, 2,000, or 4,000 yuan. Income and equal to zero if not. 26 Thus, we have measures of each argument in Equation (9) and our estimating equation is:
We estimate this equation as a probit model and report heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. 27 The …rst key hypothesis from our model is that < 0 because sector-speci…c trade protection will raise the income of workers in that industry, reducing the utility of individuals who have lower incomes than the industry under consideration for trade protection (see Equation (4a) above). The second main hypothesis from our model is that > 0 because sector-speci…c trade protection will raise the income of workers in that industry, increasing the utility of individuals who have higher incomes than the industry under consideration for trade protection (see Equation (4b) above). In short, new trade barriers increase or decrease inequality depending on who you are and thus the direction of our envy and altruism parameters, although both indicating a form of inequality aversion, are in opposite directions. 28 Our initial speci…cation follows directly from our theoretical framework. Given that our substantive interest is in estimating the Envy and Altruism parameters, it is important to note that this analysis makes the usual strong identi…cation assumptions of a cross-sectional analysis. For example, these assumptions would be violated if the model was incomplete and the omitted factors were correlated with Personal Income, Envy, or Altruism. In a second speci…cation, we add two additional controls. The …rst is an indicator variable, Per- for a related discussion), this speci…caton would only estimate 2 8 We note that our estimates of the envy and altruism parameters investigate whether the data from the experiment are consistent with our theoretical framework. It is possible that an alternative theory, perhaps an alternative theory of other regarding preferences would explain the data as well. We note though that the results described below are more consistent with inequality aversion-envy and altruism-than a pure altruism account. incomes greater than the income of the average worker in the industry under consideration for protection are more supportive of sector-speci…c trade barriers, the greater their income is relative the income of workers in the industry which may be protected. To get a sense of the magnitude of this e¤ect, the e¤ect of increasing the Altruism measure from 0-the value assigned to the variable when the respondent has an income less than or equal to the average income in the industry under consideration for trade protection-to 2.68-a two standard deviation increase equivalent to a income di¤erence of 2,680 yuan-on the probability of supporting new trade barriers, holding all other variables at their means is 0.085 (standard error of 0.038), indicating that the probability of favoring new trade barriers increases 8.5
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percentage points which is a 19% increase from the overall mean of the Trade Opinion 1 measure. 29 As discussed above, this speci…cation follows from the theoretical model but could be biased if the model is incomplete and some unobserved and omitted factors in ‡uencing trade opinions are correlated with Personal Income, Envy, or Altruism. The Model 4 speci…cation in Table 3 speci…cation also adds …xed e¤ects for industry of employment. Not surprisingly given the design of the experiment, our estimates of the envy and altruism parameters and are quite similar to those reported for Model 4. Overall, the estimates in Table 3 provide robust evidence that in China, altruism has a positive e¤ect on support for trade protection. Table 4 percentage points which is over a 30% increase from the overall mean of the Trade Opinion 1 measure. It is worth noting that the fact that our estimates for are subsantially larger than those for is consistent with much of the existing behavioral economics literature on inequality aversion which often suggests that envy may be relatively more in ‡uential in motivating behavior.
As discussed in the results for China, this speci…cation follows from the theoretical model but could be biased if the model is incomplete. The Model 4 speci…cation in Table 4 Table   4 provide robust evidence that envy and altruism have an important e¤ect on support for trade protection in our U.S. data.
Taken together the results in both China and the United States strongly support the overall argument of this paper. One reason that lower-earning sectors receive more trade protection around the world may be that citizens support trade protection more for lowearning sectors. This support could obviously be in ‡uential in a democratic setting but it could also be in ‡uential in an environmnent in which special interests dominate whether it be in a democratic or non-democratic regime. Furthermore, when we combine our model with our experiment, our empirical results are consistent with inequality aversion-in the form of envy and altruism-accounting for why individuals are more supportive of protection for lower-earning sectors.
Envy, Atruism, and Ine¢ cient Policy
One of the distinctive features of trade policy is that it is an ine¢ cient policy instrument for redistributing income. In fact, why governments use trade policy at all to redistribute income when other policies could do so more e¢ ciently is a central question in the international political economy literature. To explore further the importance of inequality aversion in understanding trade policy preferences and perhaps shed some light on why individual citizens support costly redistribution, we conducted a small follow-up experiment with a subset of our U.S. respondents. We asked the following question immediately after the respondents answered the initial trade question analyzed above:
Considering this same industry in which the average worker makes X dollars per year, economists have estimated that to raise this worker's salary by 5,000 dollars per year through new trade barriers such as import taxes and quotas, it would cost Y dollars per year to the US economy in terms of higher consumer prices and higher costs for other industries for each worker helped. Do you still favor or oppose these new trade barriers?
IF FAVOR: Do you strongly favor or only somewhat favor new trade barriers for this industry?
IF OPPOSE: Do you strongly oppose or only somewhat oppose new trade barriers for this industry?
The value of X was set equal to the same value initially assigned to that respondent (18,000, 40,000, or 80,000 dollars) in our main question described above and the value of Y was set equal to either 5,000 dollars for the e¢ cient redistribution or 7,500 for the ine¢ cient redistribution. This experiment allows us to investigate whether the pattern of trade preferences that we observe in our main experiment remain even when the ine¢ ciency of the policy is made salient to respondents. 31 The evidence presented thus far already suggests that inequality aversion helps explain support for ine¢ cient redistributive trade policy but our second experiment makes the ine¢ ciency unambiguous. Table 5 Table 5 reports the di¤erences across treatment groups under the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient prime. Crucially, the estimates under the ine¢ - 3 1 One caveat which should be kept in mind in thinking about this second experiment is that our survey respondents may have a tendency to stick to their original policy opinion in order to remain consistent in their views. We would note though that almost 20% of our respondents changed positions from support to opposition or vice-versa. Further, as we discuss below there is heterogeneity in our results across the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient prime suggesting individuals were willing to respond to the new information. Table 2 and the probit estimates employ the Model 3 speci…cation  from Tables 3 and 4. cient prime are 0.115, 0.182, and 0.067 for the low-wage minus middle-wage treatment, the low-wage minus high-wage treatment, and middle-wage minus high-wage treatment respectively. These di¤erences are in the predicted direction, are of similar magnitudes as in our main experiment, and are statistically sign…cant at the 0.01, 0.00, and 0.11 levels. Under the e¢ cient policy prime, the results indicate a signi…cant di¤erence between the low and high-wage treatments and middle and high-wage treatments but not between the low and middle-wage treatments. Thus, if anything, the average wage of workers in the industry under consideration is more important for understanding preferences when the ine¢ ciency of the policy is salient. This strengthens our interpretation that our main results indicate that social concerns are important for understanding why individuals are more or less likely to support costly redistributions. The third panel in Table 5 reports the regression estimates for the Middle Wage Treatment and High Wage Treatment variables.employing the Model 1 speci…caton which includes demographic controls and state …xed e¤ects. These estimates con…rm the pattern observed in the di¤erence estimates.
The fourth and …nal panel in Table 5 presents probit estimates of the envy and altruism parameters employing our baseline Model 3 speci…cation. Again, focusing our attention on the estimates for the respondents who received the ine¢ cient prime, we …nd our estimates quite similar to those reported in Table 4 . The estimate for the envy parameter is -0.013
(with a standard error of 0.003) compared to the Table 4 estimate of -0.011. The altruism estimate is 0.005 which is identi…cal to that in Table 4 . However, the altruism hestimate here is imprecisely estimated with a standard error equal to the magnitude of the coe¢ cient. 32 Again, when we compare these estimates across the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient prime, the results suggest if anything envy and altruism are more important for understanding policy opinions when it is salient that the policy is ine¢ cient.
Conclusion
In this paper we have documented a new puzzle in international political economy. For a broad sample of countries, we show that in the very large majority of cases it is lower-earning, less-skilled intensive industries that receive relatively high levels of trade protection. What is especially puzzling is that this pattern of protection holds even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to be the relatively abundant factor of production and therefore would be expected in many standard political-economy frameworks to receive relatively low, not high, levels of protection.
We o¤er an explanation of this puzzle: individual preferences that display inequity aversion. Expanding a standard framework of trade policy to include inequity aversion yields a pattern of trade protection like that of our puzzle. To provide empirical evidence in support
of our explanation, we analyze policy preferences in national samples of citizens in China and the United States. First, we show that preferences aggregated across all respondents in each country vary systematically with the treatment income of industry workers: industries with lower-income workers receive broader support for trade protection. Second, we derive from our model and estimate an equation of policy preferences, …nding that individuals in both countries have the social preferences of altruism and envy assumed in our model. Econometrically identifying these preferences lends considerable support to our explanation of the trade-policy puzzle, and suggests that social concerns as well as self-interest in ‡uence opinion formation about trade policy. Further, our evidence suggests that it may be productive to focus greater attention on how social concerns may in ‡uence the policymaking process across many areas of government economic policymaking.
